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I
Abstract
This paper considers a two-period model of repeated franchise bidding or
second sourcing. A regulator contracts with a single firm in each period,
presumably because of increasing returns to scale. The incumbent firm invests
in the first period. The investment may be transferable to a second source or
not; and may be monetary or in human capital. Each firm has private
information about its intrinsic efficiency, and, if it is selected to produce.
about the cost-reducing effort it exerts and the investment it makes. The
regulator, however, observes the firm's realized cost at the end of the period
(the cost includes monetary investments and may be random). In the second
period the incumbent firm can be replaced by an entrant. The regulator commits
to an optimal breakout rule.
The paper generalizes an earlier result that the optimal policy is to
regulate through contracts linear in cost overruns. It also derives
conclusions concerning the intertemporal evolution of incentive schemes.
Mainly, it puts emphasis on the issue of bidding parity. It shows that three
basic effects guide the optimal bias in the second-period auctioning process
and determines whether the incumbent should be favored depending on the nature
of investments. The outcome of the analysis is a relatively pessimistic
assessment of the desirability of second sourcing when sizeable investments
are at stake.
Last we reinterpret the second source as a raider, and the breakout as a
takeover. We discuss the desirability of defensive tactics, and obtain some
relationships between the size of managerial stock options, the amount of
defensive tactics, the firm's performance and the probability of a takeover.
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I INTRODUCTION
The regulation of a natural monopoly is often a repeated matter. The
dynamic aspects of regulation pose specific organizational difficulties. The
first difficulty, ignored in this paper, is associated with limited commit-
ment, which can have three causes : future contingencies may be hard to
foresee or to write into the contract (incomplete contract) ; the parties may
be unable to commit not to renegotiate, i.e. not to sign a new mutually
advantageous contract; and (in the context of regulation and planning) a
regulator or a planner may not be able to bind the current and especially
future administrations not to renege on the initial contract. A particularly
accute issue with non-commitment is the ratcheting effect, which reflects the
regulated firms' fear of facing demanding incentive schemes tomorrow if they
prove efficient today; this ratchet effect considerably reduces the efficacy
of high powered incentive schemes i.e., schemes that leave a large fraction of
cost savings to the firm (Laffont-Tirole (1985)).
The second difficulty consists in determining the optimal breakout rule.
If the regulated monopoly 's performance is not adequate, it may be in the
regulator's interest to look for another firm (or team of managers) to replace
the incumbent. Second sourcing indeed occurs in the reprocurement of defense
contracts, or in the repeated bidding of franchises or in private
contracting.Should auctions be set up, that sequentially pick the regulated
firm? Should such auctions be concerned with bidding parity between the
incumbent and the entrants? What is the incumbent firm's incentive to invest
in physical capital? In human capital? The determination of the optimal
breakout policy is the topic of this paper.
The "Chicago approach" to regulating a natural monopoly (Demsetz (1968)),
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Stigler (1968), Posner (1972)) suggests that a monopoly franchise be awarded
to the firm that offers to supply the product on the best terms. Franchise
bidding may also be repeated over time to adjust for new, non-con-tracted for
circumstances or to encourage entry of another, more efficient firm.
1Williamson (1976) , responding to this approach, has forcefully made the
following points.
1 ) Physical capital, and even more human capital, are not always easily
transferable from one firm to the other. Hence symmetry between the firms is
unusual at the franchise renewal stage. The incumbent enjoys an advantage over
its competitors 2.
2) Even when the incumbent's capital is transferable, the corresponding
investment is hard to measure (accounting records can be distorted ; the
quality of past investment choices admits no monetary measure ; the incumbent
can integrate into supply or arrange kickbacks from the equipment suppliers ;
depreciation charges are ambiguous). The prospect of possibly being replaced
by an entrant lowers the incumbent's incentive to invest in capital which it
won't be able to transfer at the right price 3
These two points form the building blocks of our model. We assume that
part of the incumbent's investment is general (transferable) and part is
specific (non-transferable) (point 1). Furthermore the regulator can observe
the regulated firm's cost (or profit), but is unable to recover the precise
amount of investment from this aggregate accounting data (point 2).
The model has two periods. In the first, the regulator offers an incen-
tive contract to a single firm (the incumbent). The incumbent's cost (which is
the only variable observed by the regulator) is a function of the firm's
intrinsic productivity or efficiency (), the firm's first period "effort"
(e ) and its investment. The firm knows its productivity and chooses both
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effort and investment. In the second period (reprocurement stage), the regu-
lator can keep the incumbent or invite another firm (the entrant) to replace
the incumbent. The entrant's intrinsic productivity (') is known to the
entrant only and can be higher or lower than the incumbent's. The second-
period cost of the selected firm depends on its productivity, its second-
period effort and on first-period investment (general for the entrant,
specific and general for the incumbent). As we will show, random shocks in
cost can be added without any change in our results.
Besides general and specific investments, we also distinguish investments
depending on whether they are monetary or non-monetary, i.e., on whether they
appear in the first period accounting data or they represent an effort cost to
the managers:
a) Monetary investment: In this case, we assume a simple cost tech-
nology: C1 = - e + (i2/2) for the incumbent in the first period,
C2 = 3 - e 2 - oi for the incumbent in the second period (no breakout), and
C' = R' - e' - aki for the entrant in the second period (breakout), where
O k 1. That is, a fraction k of the firm's cost savings due to investment
is general and a fraction 1 - k is specific (not transferable). Because of
investment specificity, we must carefully define bidding parity. A trivial
observation is that specific investments put the entrant at a disadvantage.
More interesting is the question of whether the entrant should be put at a
disadvantage; given both firms' second-period efficiencies (which include
the effect of investments). We say that the regulator favors the incumbent if
there exists 3*() < - i(1 - k) such that the entrant is selected if and
only if ¢3' .'*(3) (Note that a full information first - or second - bid
auction would yield a cutoff value 3*(s) = - i(1 - k)). That is,
the regulator may select the incumbent even though its intrinsic efficiency
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(corrected for the discrepancy in specific investment) is lower than the
entrant's. Similarly the regulator may favor the entrant at the reprocurement
stage. We say that bidding parity obtains when the regulator favors neither
the incumbent nor the entrant.
b) Non monetary investment (learning by doing): In this case we assume
that rather than buying equipment (monetary investment), the managers of the
firm reduce the second-period cost by raising their human capital. Their
second-period human capital is related to the intensity of their first period
work (for instance, the managers can exert effort that yields a device that
reduces first period cost, and this device is still around at no extra cost in
the second period). The specific functional form that we will be using is as
follows : the incumbent's first period cost is C1 = - e1. Its second period
cost (in the case of no breakout) is C2 = - e2 - (a + b)e 1 (where a, b 0);
the entrant's second period cost (in case of breakout) is C' = ' - e' - ae1.
That is, a/(a + b) is the fraction of general human capital (transferable
through transfer of personnel or compulsory exchange of information) and
b/(a + b) is the fraction of specific human capital. We will say that the
regulator favors the incumbent if there exists ,*(.3) < - be1 such that the
entrant is selected if and only if ' s *().
The distinction between the two types of investments is not semantic.
Monetary investment increases the first period cost, while learning by doing
investment decreases it. Not surprisingly, the policy implications will turn
out to be slightly sensitive on the nature of investments.
Our paper emphasizes three themes : bidding parity (does the regulator
favor or discourage entry?); possibility of second sourcing through an auc-
tion mechanism ; extent of incentives (does the incumbent face a steeper in-
centive scheme in the second period than the entrant? than itself in the first
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period ?).
Concerning bidding parity, we will unveil three effects. Because the
derivations are somewhat complex, we here take the liberty of lengthening this
introduction in order to offer the heuristics behind these effects. The first
two effects exist for both monetary and non-monetary investments. The third
appears only in the case of a non-monetary investment.
1) Non appropriability of general investment. Note first that because of
moral hazard only a fraction of the incumbent's first-period cost is reim-
bursed to the incumbent. Hence monetary investments, just like non-monetary
ones, are costly to the incumbent. Now the incumbent is reluctant to make
general investments, because it will not be the beneficiary in case of breal:-
out (note that specific investments will also be lost in case of a breakout,
but this effect is correctly internalized by the incumbent). Thus general
investment creates a positive externality from the incumbent to the entrant.
The way to encourage the incumbent to increase its general investment is to
lower the probability of a breakout. This effect calls for favoring the incum-
bent in the reprocurement stage.
2) Rent differential associated with specific investment. This effect is
more subtle than the first. To understand it, it is convenient to recall the
static single firm regulatory problem. Let .3 be drawn from a cumulative
distribution function F(.), with density f(.) on [, 3]. hen choosing an
incentive scheme for the firm, the regulator must trade off efficiency (which
would call for a fixed price contract), and minimization of the firm's infor-
mational rent (which would call for a cost-plus contract). This trade off
yields a distortion in the effort allocation for all > . By reducing the
distortion in effort for parameter 3, the regulator realizes a gain propor-
tional to f(3). At the same time, it must give a higher rent to all types of
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firms that are more efficient than e (in proportion F( )), because the latter
can always mimic the behavior of a less efficient firm. At the optimum, the
marginal gain in efficiency must equal the marginal cost associated with the
firm's expected rent. Hence the effort distortion increases with the "hazard
rate" F(!)/f(3). Now consider our two-period model. Suppose that the incum-
bent's and the entrant's productivity parameters e and ' are independently
drawn from the same distribution F(.) (that is, we want to attribute any
observable discrepancy in intrinsic efficiency to the incumbency advantage).
Suppose that, in the second period, the regulator does not favor the incumbent
or the entrant, and consider parameters 3 and i' such that the two firms have
the same second-period intrinsic efficiency. In the presence of specific
investment, 13' = 3*(3) < 13. Thus, if we make the classic assumption that the
hazard rate F/f is an increasing function,4 one has F(!*)/f(i*) F(3)/f().
This means that at equal second-period intrinsic efficiency, the optimal
regulation of the entrant calls for less distortion of effort than that of the
incumbent. An equivalent way of rephrasing this intuition consists in noticing
that the selection of a firm amounts to an upward truncation of the
distribution of its productivity parameter. Thus, at equal second-period
intrinsic efficiency, the regulator is less uncertain about the entrant's
productivity than about the incumbent's, and therefore can regulate the
entrant more efficiently. Specific investments thus call for favoring the
entrant at the reprocurement stage.
An interesting analogy with the literature can be drawn here. Demski,
Sappington and Spiller (1987) offer a second sourcing example in which the
purchaser selects the entrant rather than the incumbent to be the producer,
even though he knows that the incumbent has lower production costs (Corollary
5, page 91. For similar results, see Caillaud [1985], and in the classic
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context of auctioning of an object, Myerson [1981] and McAfee-McMillan
[1984]). The Demski et al model does not have any investment. However, the
incumbent's and the entrant's production costs are in this example drawn from
asymmetric distributions: the incumbent's cost distribution is assumed to
stochastically dominate the entrant's. Our model does presume identical cost
distributions ex-ante, but the existence of specific investment confers a
(statistical) superiority on the incumbent ex-post. Like Demski et al., we
find that this stochastic dominance by the incumbent calls for favoring the
entrant.
3) First-period incentive effect under learning by doing. Recall that
the incumbent's informational rent comes from the possibility of mimicking a
less efficient type's cost by exerting less effort. Under learning by doing, a
reduction in the first period effort reduces the second period efficiency and
rent, and this all the more if the probability of keeping the franchise is
high. So, the regulator, by increasing the probability of choosing the
incumbent in the second period, makes it more costly for the incumbent to hide
its efficiency in the first period. This effect (which does not exist for
monetary investments) calls for favoring the incumbent.
Bidding (non) parity results from these three effects. So for instance,
in the absence of specific investment, the incumbent should be favored; if
investment is specific and monetary, the entrant should be favored. (By con-
trast observable investments call for bidding parity). The concluding section
discusses these effects, and gives a fairly pessimistic assessment of the
desirability of second sourcing.
A second contribution of this paper is the characterization of the
optimal incentive schemes under investment and second sourcing. We generalize
5our earlier result (Laffont-Tirole (1986)) that the regulator can use a menu
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of linear contracts. This property is particularly attractive under cost
uncertainty. Our linear schemes are still optimal if random measurement or
forecast errors are added to the functions C1, C2, C' (indeed they are
optimal under any uncertainty about the distribution of the noise term).
Linearity means that the regulator can ask the regulated firm to announce an
expected cost for the period. The firm is then penalized or rewarded as a
function of cost overruns. In our model, we can prove that the regulator can
optimally give incentive schemes of the following form (where "a" identifies
announced costs) :
1(C, 1 1 G (C(Ca)(C) C1 ) to the incumbent in period onetl(C11 G11 1 (C)(C1
a a a a a a
2 2 2 1 2 (2' 1) K2 2)2 (C2 
two (in case of no breakout)
t'(Ca, C'C) K' C
t(C', C' 1) = G(C ', C) - (Ca)(C. - C ') to the entrant in period
two (in case of breakout),
where t1, t2 and t' are the net transfers (after cost reimbursement), G1, G2
and G the fixed components of the transfers, and K1, K2 and K' the slopes of
the incentive schemes (these slopes are equal to 0 for cost-plus contracts and
to 1 for fixed-fee contracts).
The initeresting questions refer to the slopes of the incentive
schemes : how do those schemes compare to cost-plus and fixed-price contracts?
Do incentives go up over time for the incumbent (K1 < K2)? Does the entrant
face steeper incentives? We find that most incentive contracts are "incentive
contracts", with slope between 0 and 1. An exception is the case of learning
by doing for which the slope of the first period incentive scheme may exceed
I . The intuition in this case is that to give incentives to invest in general
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and specific learning by doing, the regulator strongly penalizes high first
period costs. A second result (also a generalization of our earlier results)
is that the slopes of these incentive schemes decrease with announced cost. A
third result is that, under a monetary investment, the incumbent's incentives
to exert effort grow over time (K1 < K2). The intuition is that a contract
resembling more a cost plus contract in the first period is more conducive to
monetary investments, while a contract closer to a fixed price contract in the
second period allows the incumbent to cash the proceeds of the investment.
This result is to be contrasted with the learning by doing case, for which,
under some conditions, K1 > K2. As we observed earlier, learning by doing
calls for strong cost incentives in the first period. We again observe the
crucial role played by the nature of investment. Last we show that, for
= 3', the incumbent is given a steeper second-period incentive scheme than
the entrant.
We can reinterpret our model of second sourcing as one of takeovers. The
incumbent firm becomes the incumbent management team. The second source is the
raider (rival management team). Cost is reinterpreted as profit. Favoring the
incumbent at the contract renewal stage corresponds to allowing certain
defensive tactics. Our pessimistic assessment of second sourcing translates
into a qualification of the economists' recent partial view of takeovers as a
managerial discipline device. We also show that, in an optimal managerial
contract, the firm's performance, the manager's golden parachute and his level
of stock options are positively correlated. These three variables are
negatively correlated with the probability of a takeover.
Finally we should make a methodological point concerning the amount of
information received by the entrant about the incumbent's productivity. The
revelation principle tells us that the principal may w.l.o.g. ask the incum-
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bent to truthfully announce his type: = .Should 3 be revealed to the
entrant? If not, the incumbent's first-period cost still reveals information
about the incumbent's productivity. Is it worth distorting the first-period
allocation to garble the entrant's information about ? For instance, if
the optimal first-period regulation implies that C1 perfectly reveals (as
will be the case here), would one want to induce some first-period pooling, so
that the entrant would possess less information about than the principal
and possibly would bid more agressively? Fortunately the answer is no. Maskin
and Tirole (1985), in their study of contracts designed by an informed
principal, (here the regulator), show that, if preferences are quasi-linear
(as is the case in this paper), the design of the contract for the entrant
does not depend on whether the agent (here the entrant) knows the principal's
information or not. Hence there is no point hiding the announcement e from the
entrant or distorting the first-period allocation7
Before proceeding we would like to acknowledge the earlier literature
on intertemporal procurement of a single firm under commitment (Baron-Besanko
(1984)), second sourcing (Anton-Yao (1987), Caillaud (1985), Demski et al
(1987), Scharfstein (1986)) and auctions of incentive contracts (Laffont-
Tirole (1987), McAfee-McMillan (1987), Riordan-Sappington (1987)). Although
none of these papers considers simultaneously intertemporal regulation,
investment and second sourcing, and therefore is apt to address the issue of
bidding parity, we make considerable use of their insights.
Section II describes the main characteristics of our dynamic model. The
case of observable monetary investment is treated in Section III. Unobservable
monetary investment is taken up in Section IV. Section V deals with learning
by doing. Section VI sketches the takeover reinterpretation; and a few
conclusions are gathered in Section VII.
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II THE BASIC MODEL
We first consider a two-period information and investment-free model.
Each period a project valued S by consumers must be realized. In period 1,
there is a single firm, the incumbent, with cost function:
(1) C1 = 3- e I
where 3 E [C, B] is its intrinsic cost parameter and e 1 is the level of
effort achieved by the firm's manager. The disutility of effort is
vU(el) ', > "' >0, ''' 0.8
In period 2 the incumbent has a cost function:
(2) C2 = - e2
where B is the same parameter as in period 1 and e2 is the effort exerted in
period 2.
In period 2 there is a potential entrant with cost function:
(3) C' = (' - e'
where 3' ¢ [B, 3] is the entrant's intrinsic cost parameter and e' is his
level of effort. The entrant has the same disutility of effort as the
incumbent.
The parameters /3 and '3' are independently drawn from the same distri-
bution with c.d.f.F(3) and density function f(.) continuous and positive
on [, i], with d(F(3)/f(3))/d3 a 0. 9
The regulator's problem is to organize production so as to maximize
social welfare.
The expected utility level of the incumbent is:
(4) U = t - (el) - i(e2),
where 6 is the firm's discount factor, is the probability that the incumbent
will remain active in period 2, t is the net (i.e. in addition to realized
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costs) expected transfer received by the firm from the regulator.
To obtain the incumbent's participation the regulator must ensure that:
(5) U 0,
where the individual rationality level has been normalized to zero (note
that, because of commitment, we consider only an intertemporal individual
rationality constraint. We will later show that the optimal allocation can be
implemented through a second-period auction, so that one can costlessly
satisfy the second-period individual rationality constraint as well).
The entrant's utility level if it is active in period 2 is :
(6) V = t' - (e'),
where t' is the net transfer received from the regulator. The entrant's
individual rationality constraint is:
(7) V > O.
Under complete information it is clear that the potential entrant should
be allowed to enter if and only if ' ( R.
Let (1 + ) be the social opportunity cost of money. Then, the consumers'
expected utility level is:
(8) S - (1 + )(C1 + t) + (1 - F())[S - (1 + ) (C2 + t2)]
.11
+ X [S - (1 + )(C'(') + t'( '))] f(3')d3'
assuming that consumers have the same discount factor as the incumbent.
An utilitarian regulator maximizes the sum of expected utilities of
consumers and firms. As ) 0, the IR constraints (5) and (6) are binding. The
regulator's optimization program reduces to:
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(9) Max IS (1 + 6) - (1 + )( - e1 + V(el))
lel,e 2 ,e' I
- (1 - F(3))(1 + )( - e2 + tp (e2 ))
- (1 + ) { (3' - e' + (e'))f(3')d!'I
yielding the first order conditions:
(10) v'(e 1) = ,'(e2) = ''(e') = 1
To sum up, the marginal disutility of each type of effort is equated to
its marginal benefit, the IR constraints are binding because transfers are
costly ( ) 0), and the entrant is selected if and only if ' < .
Suppose now that the regulator observes cost but does not know the
parameters B and 3' even though it knows their distribution and that it cannot
observe effort levels. As will be seen as special cases of the forthcoming
section, effort levels should then be distorted but the entry rule should
remain the same, the intrinsic cost parameters being elicited through a
revelation mechanism. An intuitive explanation can be given as follows. With
respect to the incumbent, because of perfect correlation of e across periods,
the optimal dynamic revelation mechanism with commitment is the repetition of
the optimal Laffont and Tirole (1986) static mechanism whatever the weight
attached to period 2. As moreover the incentive problem created by the entrant
is independent of the first one, there is no point in distorting the entry
rule obtained under complete information. If we denote 3*(3) the level of 8'
below which the entrant is allowed in, the breakout rule is 3*() = C.
We will now introduce various forms of first period investment by the
incumbent which will justify an alteration of the entry rule, i.e. the unequal
treatment of the incumbent and the entrant in the second period.
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III OBSERVABLE MONETARY INVESTMENT
Let us assume now that the incumbent can, by investing i2/2 in period 1,
decrease its cost in period 2 by a i. This investment can either be non
specific, i.e. decrease also by i the cost of the entrant, or specific, i.e.
decrease only its own cost. We let k denote the fraction of investment that is
transferable to the entrant:
(11) C1= .- e + (i2 /2)
(12) C2 = - e2 - oi
(13) C' = "' - e' - kai
Under complete information, the breakout rule is
.R*(3) = - (l-k)i,
i.e. the second period efficiency levels are simply compared. The regulator's
optimization problem is therefore:
(14) Max IS( + 6) - (1 + )(,R - e1 + (i2/2) + P(el))
{e1, e2, e',i)
- 6(1 - F( - (1 - k)i))(1 + )(3 - e2 - ai + (e2))
e (.3)
-6(1 + ) f (3' - e' - kci + p(e'))f(3')d'}
where e, e2 and i are functions of and e' is a function of '.
This is a quasi concave problem1 0 with first order conditions:
(15) r' (e1) = '(e 2) = '(e') = 1
(16) i = 0. [(1 - F(B - a(1 - k)i)) + kF( - a(1 - k)i)]
(16) tells us that investment should be set at the level that equates its
marginal cost, i, with its expected social marginal utility which is 6o if the
investment is non-specific (k = 1), but only a(1 - F(¢ - i)) if it is
specific (k = 0). The positive externality of the first period investment on
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the entrant must be internalized when it exists.
Suppose now that the investment is observable by the regulator (from
accounting data), but that the regulator cannot observe effort levels and does
not know the values of 3 and 3'. However, he knows that and ' are indepen-
dently drawn in the distribution F(.) and he can ex post observe costs. The
regulator must use incentive mechanisms to extract these pieces of infor-
mation in order to organize production and compensate managers for their
efforts. We assume that the regulator can commit over the two periods. From
the revelation principle the optimal regulatory mechanism is identical to a
revelation mechanism which specifies for the incumbent, a transfer t(3), an
investment i(3), a cost in period 1, C1(3), and a cost in period 2, C2(3) if
the first period firm is kept in period 2, and for the entrant, a transfer
t'(.3',i) and a cost C'(3',i) if the entrant is selected, i.e. if '3' < *(3,i),
where t', C',* can depend on i which is observable (it is easily shown that
the optimal breakout policy is a tail truncation). Despite the fact that i
is a function of , the notations C'(', i) and 3*(3, i) and similar
subsequent notations should not be confusing.
Let us first characterize the revelation mechanisms which induce truthful
revelation by the incumbent.
The incumbent maximizes his expected utility with respect to his
announcement . His expected utility is:
(17) U(U, ) = t(i) -C t(8 - C1(') + (i /2))
- 6(1 - F(*( , i))) '( - C2(¢) - i).
Let us denote U(3) = U(., ), the expected utility from truthtelling.
From incentive compatibility, U(3) is non increasing in 3 and therefore almost
everywhere differentiable. At a point of differentiability, the envelope
theorem implies that:
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2(18) U(.3) = -' (.3 - C(3) + (i2/2)) - 6(1 - F(8 (,, i)))V'" (. -C2(3) - oi)
(where i depends on ).
Sufficient second order conditions are (see appendix 1):
dC1 dC2 d.
(19) --- > 0; --- z 0; --- O.
Od. 3d.( d,3
Note that U 0 so that 'the IR-constraint will be binding at .3 only (as
the regulator's welfare is decreasing in U-see below). Then the incumbent's
IR-constraint reduces to:
(20) U(,3) = 0.
Similarly, for any .3, the potential entrant announces ' to maximize:
(21) V(' U ' i) = t'(8' i) - (' - C'(8' i) - ki)
As above, let V(.', i) -V(.¢', /3', i) denote the entrant's utility level
when telling the truth. From incentive compatibility and the envelope theorem
we have:
(22) V(.6', i) = -'()3' - C'(.', i) - ci).
88'
The necessary and sufficient second order condition is here:
aC'
(23) (.3', i) > 0 for any i.
8 3'
As V is non increasing in .3', the entrant's IR constraint reduces to:
(24) V(.*(6, i),i) = 0 for any 3
since it is selected if and only if ' ( .3*(.,i).
Integrating (22) we derive the entrant's rent of asymmetric information
r.* (.3, i)
(25) v(.3', i) = J i '(. - C'(,R, i) - aki)d/.
If we neglect momentarily second-order conditions, incentive and IR
constraints are summarized by (18), (20), (22), and (24): The regulator must
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maximize
as state
as
(26)
his expected utility under those constraints. As we are using U and V
variables we slightly rewrite the objective function of the regulator
{ iS(1 + ) (1 + ) (C(.) + (. -C1 (.3) + (i 2 /2)) -U(.3)
.3 
- (1 + )8(1 - F(..*(.R, i)))(C2 (.3) + ,(. - C2(. ) - ci)
- ( , i)
-8 { [(1+ X)(C'(./', i) + v(l.' -aki -C'('3', i))
+ V(B', i))]f(.3')d¢3'If(.3)d.3.
This optimization problem is quasi-concave (for small) and separable.
For given R. and 3*(0., i), we can maximize the inside integral with respect to
C' under the constraints (24) and (25).
.3* (3 i)
(27) M.in [(1 + )(C'(.3', i) + (.¢' - :i - C'(.3', i)) + V(.3', i))]f(..')d'3
s.t.
(28)
aV
- (.', i) = -' (.¢' - 0h i - C' (.', i))
as ¢
(29) V(3*(.3, i), i) = 0.
The first-order condition of this control problem (see Laffont-Tirole
(1986)) yields effort e'(3') = e*(.8'), where e*(.¢') is given by:
F(3')
(30) "' (e*(.3')) = 1 - - (e*('))
1+~ f(.¢')
for any 3' < *(3, i). Equation (30) defines the optimal effort level and
therefore the optimal C' function:
(31) C*'(.3', i) = ' - oki - e*(3')
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If he is selected (.'
V* (U', i) =
< /3*(3, i)), the entrant has rent:
.'* (.,i)
3,fBa'
We can now maximize (26) with respect to C1(,3), C2 (6), *(3, i), i under
(18) and (20). This is a quasi-concave problem for ba2 small enough.
The Hamiltonian is:
(33) H = f()[S(1 + 6) - (1 + W) (C 1 ( '3) + (.1 - C1 (O) + (i2/2)) - U ()
- (1 + )6(1 - F(O*(3, )))(C2(.) + V(. - c 2(3)
.* (., i ) . i
[(1 + ) (C*' (.', i)+t(.3'-tri-C*' (.' i))+X v ' (.B-cki-C*' (.,i))d.3f (¢')d.3']3.~~~~~~~~ .~~~
a' w ~ - p(.3) [V'(.e3-C(3) + (i2 /2)) + (1-F(,.8 (.,i)))'(.-C (') -ai))I
where 1( 3) is the multiplier of the constraint (18).
From the Pontryagin principle we have:
P (.3) = - - = f().
Using the transversality condition at we have:
p(3) = F(.3).
Maximization with respect to C1, C2 gives:
F()
t,'(e 2 ( .6 )) = 1 - - - (e2 (:9 ) )
1+I f (3)
I F(.3)
V (e (.)) = - - - "" (e1(.)).
1+k f(.S)
Maximization with respect to i gives after some rearrangements:
i = o&[1 - (1 -k)F(.3*(!3,i))]
(32)
- cvi))
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
O' (e * (3) ) V.
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The marginal cost of observable investment is set equal to its expected
social marginal value.
Maximization with respect to * gives:
(39) - ai- e2( 3) + (e2(3)) - 1* - aki - e'(9*) + (e'(3*))
F(!*) F(3)
=--- [ V'(e' (3*)) - '(e 2 ( ) )]
1+ f (13) f(B)
Note finally that under our assumptions the second-order conditions
(19) and (23) are satisfied. We now draw the implications of this analysis.
Breakout rule:
Consider first the case where investment is non specific (k=1); both
firms are exactly in the same technological situation in period 2. Moreover as
seen from (30) and (36) optimal distortions of efforts in period 2 are
identical. This, together with (39), implies bidding parity: .3*(3) = 3.
Proposition 1: With observable and non specific monetary investment,
the breakout rule is 5*(e) = . That is, bidding parity holds.
Both firms are treated equally and investment being observable is set at
its optimal level, because incentives problems do not interfere with the fact
that the marginal utility of investment is always ba.
Suppose now that investment is at least partly specific (0 s k < 1). The
relevant notion of equal treatment is here
(40) 3* = - i(1 - k)
because now, for the same -value, the incumbent is more efficient. We show
below that the entrant should be favored relatively to this equal treatment
notion.
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Proposition 2: With observable and (at least partly) specific monetary
investment, the breakout rule is such that: !*(B,i) > - ai(1-k). That
is, the entrant is favored.
Proof: There is an advantage to the entrant if 3*(3,i) )> - ai(1-k).
At a. = 0 we know that there is equal treatment. The result will follow if for
any a 0 O
d3* di
(41) + (1-k) +- i(1-k) ) 0.
da do
(41) holds from straightforward differentiation of (39) and the use of the
monotone hazard rate property and (30) and (36).
Q.E.D.
At * = B - a(1-k)i, firms are technologically equivalent. However the
rent obtained in period 2 depends on for the incumbent and on 3* (< for the
entrant. So it is easier to give incentives to the entrant. Due to the "rent
differential effect" (see introduction), the entrant should be favored.
Investment level
As i is observable, it is easy to impose the optimal investment level
conditionally on the breakout. Here this results in an investment level lower
than the first best level because the expected social marginal utility of i is
lowered by the distortion in the breakout rule favoring the entrant.
Proposition 3: The observable investment level is lower than the first
best level.
Decentralization throuah linear contracts
From Laffont-Tirole (1986), we know that we can rewrite the incentive
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contract of the entrant as a menu of incentive schemes which are linear in the
overruns:
(42) t'(C', .', i) = G(.', i) - K(')(C'-C*'
with K(3') = ,'(e*'( ')).
dC*'
Denoting C*'(.R') = C 'a and remembering the second order condition - > 0,
we can rewrite the transfer
t'(C', C' a , i) = G(C 'a, i) - K(C' a , ki)(C'-C 'a)
with K(C' a ) = i- a)
= ( l(c'a) - oki - C'a).
The second-order condition associated with the menu of linear contracts
requires small enough.
We can now extend this reasoning to the case of the incumbent. For 
small enough the second-order conditions are satisfied and the transfer to the
incumbent can be decomposed into two menus of linear incentive schemes, one
for each period
t(C, C i) = G (C, i) - K(Ca, i) (C - C )tl(C C' i 2 1C' 1 C1' 1 1
a a a, a
t2(C2, C ) G2 C i) = 2( 2, i)(C2 C2
with
aK(C 1 i) = 1' (e* (t)) O ( 1 (Ca) + (i 2 /2) - Ca); Ca = C ()
K 2(C 2 , i) '(e()) ,,(. (C.a) - i - C,) ; C C*(.)
and the decomposition between G1 and G2 is arbitrary with a joint constraint
(only their discounted sum matters. But one can choose G1 and G2 so that the
individual rationality constraint is binding in each period).
Lengthy computations show that for small enough these menus of con-
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tracts induce truthtelling and right levels of effort.
From (30),(36) and (37), we see that the incumbent has incentive schemes
with the same slopes in both periods and that the entrant has (for the same
cost characteristic) also the same slope ¥,'(e*(R)) with e*(3) defined by
1 F()
(43) t,'(e*()) = 1 - - "(e*(B)).
l+~f( ()
This is true when the slopes are viewed as functions of announced 
parameters. However, we see from above that there are not the same functions
of the annouced costs.
Proposition 4: For small enough, the optimum can be decentralized
through a menu of linear contracts. The incumbent's first - and second -
period incentive schemes have the same slope: K1 = K2.
IV UNOBSERVABLE MONETARY INVESTMENT
We assume now that the investment made in period 1 is not observable by
the regulator, or the entrant. Using the revelation principle, we will look at
contracts I C1 (3), C2 (3), t(3)} for the incumbent, { C'(3', 3), t'(', 3)}
for the entrant and a breakout rule 3*(0).
We should here note that we do not allow the incumbent's contract to
depend on the entrant's realized cost C' following a breakout.Such a
dependence might be used to alleviate the incumbent's investment incentive
constraint (see below), because C' contains information about i in the case of
general investment. We have shown that in the case of specific investment, our
omission does not involve any loss of generality. It does involve a loss of
generality for transferable investments. However, even for such investments,
we feel that ignoring this dependence of t on C' is a good approximation of
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reality. First, this dependence would create a delayed transfer or penalty. So
the displaced incumbent would for instance be required to pay a penalty 5 or
10 years after the breakout which raises the issue of the feasibility of such
long run contracts. Second, and maybe more importantly, the entrant's cost may
be subject to manipulation. Indeed, ex-post, the entrant and the regulator
have an incentive to tinker with accounting data on C' so as to force the
incumbent to pay a penalty. So letting incumbent's reward depend on the
entrant's cost may not be feasible after all. Third the dependence of t on
C' might be sensitive to the exact distribution of noise in C', if any. Our
contracts fare well in those three respects. First, the transfers can follow
production immediately. Second, the incumbent's contract does not depend on
the entrant's realized cost. So this contract cannot be subject to manipu-
lation. Third, our optimal incentive schemes can be implemented through
linear contracts, and are therefore robust to any change in or any uncertainty
about the distribution of forecast or accounting errors. Last, we should note
that common auctions for contract renewal belong to the class of mechanisms
considered here.
Because the investment is not observed by the regulator, we must add a
further incentive constraint that reflects the incumbent's optimal choice of
i. Because a unit increase in i requires extra effort i, with associated
disutility i'(e 1), in the first period, and with probability (1-F(9*(3)))
reduces second-period effort by a, with associated disutility Ca1'(e2), this
incentive constraint can be written:
(44) -i'(.e - C(.) + (i2/2)) + ba(1 - F(.*(.3)))''(.3 - ai - C2 (.3)) = 12
We use this "first-order approach" because of the concavity of the agent's
program with respect to the investment choice, which holds for small enough.
Denoting by (3) the multiplier of this constraint similar derivations as in
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section III lead to the first order conditions:
X F(3)
(e (.)) = 1 -v
1+If (3)
X F(13)/' (e2(.8)) = 1 - -"' (
1+k f (8)
F (.3')
(e' (.'))= 1 - -
1+X f(.')
[, -i - e2(,8). + y(e2(,))]
x F (.13)
- [ v' (e' (*)
1+1 f (*)
( ) i
(B)) + V"(e (.))
(l+V)f ( e ()
:e2 (,8)) - yf(32())(l+~) f(.8)
vi"(e' ('))
- [.* - cki - e'(.3*) + ,(e'(3*))]
F (.3)
) - -Y' (e2 (.3)) 
f(.3)
( (e()a
(l+X) f (3)
(49) 0 = -(1 + X)f() )i"' (e1(3)) + (1 + .)6(1 - F(...*()))a' (e2(.3))f(.3)
- F(.)[i"(e 1( B)) - 6o (1-F(.&3(.8))),"(e2(.3))]
+ ,(3[) [i2 " (e ()) + ,'(e (.3)) + 2(1 - F (* (.))) (e2 ( ))
3* (.3) (3*('3) _ _
+ f(3)cOk68 (1+) P' (e'('))f(B')d8' + J "(e '() 3r ))d.f(.')dd'.
Integrating the last line of (49) and using the first order condition
with respect to C' we can replace this last line by: f(.)o6kF(.*())(l+X).
Using the otherfirst order conditions, (49) reduces to:
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
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(l+l) f (3) [i - of,((1 - F(.3*(.3)) + kF(.3* (3)) )
:, (e (.3))
We first show that the following result holds:
Lemma: v(.3) < 0 for any 3.
Proof: Substitute (44) in (50). We get:
(l+k)f(.3)
ac(1-F(*())) [' (e 2 (.)) - ' (e (3))
- k . y (e (.))] .
Suppose on the contrary that t(3) > 0. From (51) and "' > 0
e2(.) > el(.3).
From ''' > 0, we have
Let usno r(e2 (. ) rite) > ''first ord(e( r conditions relative to C) ) .
Let us now rewrite the first order conditions relative to CI
follows:
\ F(.3) (.3) i
and C2 as
t' (e1 (.13)) + - V1"(e1 (3)) = 1 + VI" (e1 (.:3))
1+ f) (+)f(. )
), F(,3)
(55) V' (e2(.2)) + ., " (e (.3)) = 1-,, (e (.)).
.l I 11 c 2f 2zBf zEcs.
.L t'. I I '.)
( .e) a
Since z,(.3) > 0, the left hand side of (54) is larger than the left hand
side of (55) implying e1(.) > e2(C
RemLrk: The condition '''
r), a contradiction.
> 0 is actually much too strong to prove
' F (3)
this iemma. It suffices that the expression t'(e) + - ' t"(e) be
1+k f ()
(50) 1 (3) =
v
(51) I, (,3) =
[r' (el(.))]
(52)
(53)
(54)
F ( .3 " _( ) )
kI 'l ) I .' )
- 28 -
non-decreasing in e (which is implied by either V,'''(e) 0 or small).
Equations (45) and (46) then imply that e1(3) e2(3 ), so that (s) < 0 from
(51), a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
We see from this lemma and (45) and (46) that K1 < K2 (since
y'(e l()) ( '(e2()).The first period contract is closer to a cost-plus
contract than the contract of the second period. Investment is encouraged if
the incentive scheme is less demanding in period 1. Then in period 1 the main
problem is to induce a high effort level and the contract can be made closer
to a fixed price contract.
Proposi tion 5: With an unobservable monetary investment, the
incumbent's first-period incentive scheme is low-powered relative to the
second-period one: K1 ( K2. Because the observable investment slope lies
between K 1 and K 2 (see Proposition 4), unobservability calls for a
flatter incentive scheme in the first period and a steeper incentive
scheme in the second period.
When investment is non specific, the only reason of treating unequally
firms in period 2 is the unobservability of i (see Proposition 1). Since the
incumbent has no reason to internalize the positive externality of i, he will
invest too little and should be favored to mitigate this effect.
Proposition 6: With unobservable and non specific investment (k=l) the
breakout rule is such that *() < . That is, the incumbent is favored.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Let A(3, 3*) E (,* - aCki) - ( - ai),
x. F (.3)(.)
h(.3, e2 ) - (e2 ) -e 2 + - s'(e2 ) + P' (e2 )
1+t f (.) (l+) f (.3)
F (.*)
and g(3*, e') e') - e' + - '(e').
1+l f(.*)
Using (46) and (47), (48) becomes:
(56). A(., .*) = max I h(, e2)I - max g( R3*, e')}.
e2 e'
Equation (56) implies that A(3,3) < 0, as (3)<0O implies that h(:,e) < g (,e)
for all e. But the definition of A yields A(.1,,) > 0, a contradiction if
.* = B were the solution. But
(57) - A(, .3*) - max Ih(3, e2)} + max g(.R*, e')l]
8.e* e 2 e'
?X d F(.3*)
(58) = 1 + - ' (e') ( ) 0
1+1 d.* f(.*)
Hence, for (56) to be satisfied, one needs 3* < ., which for k=1 implies that
the incumbent is favored.
Q.E.D.
When investment is specific, the incumbent correctly internalizes the
positive effect of i. The only effect left is the rent differential effect and
therefore the entrant should be favored.
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Proposition 7: With unobservable and specific investment, the breakout
rule satisfies 3*(3) ) 3 - ai. That is, the entrant is favored. Further-
more, the unobservability of investment imposes no cost on the regulator.
Proof of Proposition 7: Clearly the regulation can do no better when
investment is unobservable than when it is observable. Let us show that he can
do as well. For simplicity, let us assume that the conditions under which
Proposition 4 (decentralisation through linear contracts) holds are verified.
That is, the optimum can be implemented by giving the incumbent first-and
second-period linear incentive schemes which have the same slope (K1 = K2).
Suppose that the firm's investment is not regulated (even if it is
observable). The firm then chooses i so as to minimize its total expected
cost:
Kl(/3) (i'/2) - 6K2() (-F(.3-0i*(3)))oi,
where i*(3) denotes the investment determined in section III. Using the fact
that K(.)= K2(), and the equilibrium condition i = i*(3), this minimization
yields
i = 6a(1 - F( - i())),
which is nothing but (16) for k = 0.
So the firm makes the "right investment" even if the latter is not regulated.
[As a way of checking our equations, the reader will note that for k = 0, the
values '() = 0, el(B) = e2(') as given by (36) and (37), and
i = a8(1 - F(P*(B))) satisfy (44), (45), (46) and (50)].
Q.E.D.
The economic intuition is that the equality between the two slopes
implies that the social planner's and the firm's preferences toward investment
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are identical, unless there is an externality between the entrant and the
incumbent. But no such externality exists for specific investment.
Transferable investment: the linear-quadratic case.
As will be discussed later, our main focus is the case of transferable
investment (k = 1). We now obtain further results for this case, assuming that
the disutility of effort is quadratic, and the distribution of cost parameters
is uniform:
Assumption A: Al) k = 1
A2) l(e) = e2 /2
A3) F(-) is uniform on [0,1]
A4) 1 > (2x)/(1 + ).
Assumption A4 is technical (and is consistent with the second-order conditions
which require that not be too large).
We can now state:
Proposition 8: UnderassumptionA,
i) Bidding parity obtains at . = (that is, 3.*() = ).
ii) The bias in favor of the incumbent is higher, the less efficient the
incumbent (that is, d _ *(.)) > 0).
d.3
iii) The incumbent exerts more effort in the second period than the
type of the entrant which makes entry socially indifferent (that is,
e2(.3) e'(:3*(.))).
Proof of Proposition 8: See Appendix 3.
The intuition behind part (i) of Proposition 8 is that an incumbent with
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type has a zero probability of being replaced. He thus invests the socially
optimal amount, and the selection rule need not be biased to encourage invest-
ment. Part ii) conveys an important intuition: An inefficient incumbent is
replaced with high probability, and therefore invests little. The bidding
process must then be biased considerably so as to encourage him to invest.
Part iii) compares e2(B) and e'(B*(3)). We knew that e2(3) ) e'(B). However,
there is a second effect, coming from the fact that "*(3) ( and that e' is
decreasing. The two effects work in opposite directions, but the first
dominates.
Proposition 8 enables us to obtain some interesting results on the
second-period bidding process. Like in Laffont-Tirole [1987], one can view
this bidding process as a first - or second - bid auction in which each bidder
(here from each firm) bids for the right to choose from a menu of monopoly
linear incentive contracts. Unlike in our earlier auction paper, the menus of
contracts differ between the two competitors, because of the asymmetry of the
problem. Let U2(3) denote the incumbent's second-period rent associated with
the right to choose in his menu of contracts. Similarly, let U'(.') denote
the entrant's second-period rent. From incentive compatibility, we know that:
dU /d3 = - '(e2())
and
dU'/d,' = - '(e'(')).
U2(') and U'(') are thus defined up to positive constants. Although we will be
mainly interested in their derivatives, we normalize these functions by
imposing second-period individual rationality constraints. That is,
U2 (3) = 0
and
U' (1*(3)) = 0
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[recall that the highest ,`' who may be allowed to produce is 3*()].
Now consider a second-period first - or second-price auction in which
each firm bids for the right to choose from its menu of linear incentive
schemes. For simplicity, we treat the case of a second-price auction (the
first-price auction yields the same outcome from the usual equivalence
theorem). Then the incumbent bids U2() and the entrant bids U'(O'). Now, in
general, the equation U2(,¢) = U'(.') yields .3' !3*(R), so that the second-
price auction does not necessarily select the right firm. The auction must
thus be biased. One way of doing so is to introduce a "golden parachute" or
"cancellation fee" G(.) to be paid to the incumbent if he is replaced. So, one
can envision a first-period contracting process in which the incumbent chooses
a first-period incentive scheme and a second-period golden parachute. The
second-period allocation is determined by the above described auction.
In order for the right firm to be selected, the golden parachute must
satisfy:
U 2 (.3) - G(3) = U' (*(5)),
as the incumbent shades his second-period bid by G(.').
So
G(.3) = f' (e2 (x)) d>; - f ' (e'(x))dx
2 <.?.* ()
or
^3 d.13*
We have:
Proposition 9: Under assumption A, the golden parachute is positive, and
decreases with the incumbent's efficiency (that is, G(:3) 0, G(') < 0).
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Proof of proposition 9: For a quadratic disutility of effort, one has:
,~ d 8*
G(.) = J (e2 - e' )dx
3 dB
dB
Proposition 8 (parts ii) and iii)) implies that e 2 > e'-.
d.3
Q.E.D.
As we mentioned earlier, the important result in Proposition 9 is that the
golden parachute decreases with the firm's efficiency.
To summarize, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a second-
period auction, in which each firm bids for the right to be the monopoly
supplier. Efficient selection is obtained by offering in the first-period a
golden parachute together with a first-period incentive scheme. The golden
parachute is characterized in Proposition 9.
V LEARNING BY DOING
We assume now that the effort of the incumbent in period 1, el, affects
costs in period 2 through a learning by doing effect:
(59) C2 = B- e2 - (a + b)e 1
beI is firm specific, but ae1 is also transferred to the entrant in case
of breakout, i.e.
(60) C' = ' - e' - ae1.
The first best breakout rule is *(0) = - be1, and we study in this
section the effect of asymmetric information on the optimal breakout rule.
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Under complete information the optimal effort levels would be determined
by the program:
(61) Max iS(1 + ) - (1 + )( - e +O,(el))
{e, e2 e, 'l
-6(1 - F(, - be1) ) ( +) ( - e2- (a + b)e1 + (e2 ))
- (be 
-b(1 + O) ('-e' -ae1 + V"(e'))f( ')d'} i
13
with first order conditions13
(62) ' i(e1) = 1 + a + 6b(1 - - bel))
(63) l' (e2 ) = 1
(64) " (e') = 1.
In particular (62) equates the marginal disutility of effort to its total
marginal social benefit, i.e.,the first period benefit, 1, plus the non
specific effect on second period, a, plus the expected specific effect,
bb(I - F( - be1)).
Under incomplete information we must add the incentive constraints in the
regulator's optimization program. Following the same lines of argument as in
Section III we obtain, for the incumbent:
(65) U () = - '(3 - C1()) - (1 - a -b)(1 - F(-*(3)))
t"'((1 -a -b). + (a + b) C1 (.3) - C2 ( ) ).
Sufficient second-order conditions are (see appendix 2)
dC dC dC de*
(66) 1> O; > (a + b) ; > 0.
d . d . d .3 d3
The incumbent's individual rationality constraint reduces to:
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(67) U(.) = 0
The entrant's incentive contraints are:
8B'(68) - V(.', /3) = -V'(/,' -a(3 - C (.3)))
AC'
(69) (R', /3) 0
a'and the IR co straint is:
and the IR constraint is:
(70) V(3*(3), ) = 0.
The first-order conditions of the regulator's quasi-concave maximization
problem are:
F(/3')
(71) V,' (e' (3')) = 1 - - "(e' ('))
1+\ f (,')
X F(.3)
(72) I' (e1(B)) = 1 + 6a +6b(1 - F(.!*(.3))) - -"(el(B))
1+1 f (,)
x F(.g)
(73) ' (e2(.8)) = 1 - (1 - a - b)"(e 2( ))
1+1 f (3)
(74) .3 - be1(.3) - e2(3) + (e2(.)) - (9* - e'(.3*) + a.(e' (*)))
X F(.3*) F ()
= [ ' (e'(.13*)) - (1 - a -b) - (e2C)) 3
1+X f(¢*) f(.¢)
Equation (71) which describes the effort level of the entrant is the same
as in the static one-firm problem (Laffont-Tirole (1986)), i.e. asymmetric
information somewhat decreases the effort level with respect to the complete
information case except at . = . Equation (72) differs from the first best
equation through the term due to incomplete information
XF(.) "'(e (3))/(1 + )f(.1) and possibly through the distortion of * (.3) from
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B - be1 analyzed below. More interestingly we see in (73) that the asymmetric
information term is altered by the factor 1 - a -b. Asymmetric information
decreases less the effort level in period 2 than in a dynamic problem without
learning, because of the intertemporal effect created by the first period
effort level. The incentive problem is alleviated by the fact that the
incumbent has more reasons to take a high level of effort in period 1. This is
a crucial difference with the equation describing the entrant's effort level.
For the same cost characteristic the incumbent is induced, at the same price
for the regulator, to exert more effort than the entrant.
We now study the question of bidding parity.
Proposi tion 10: With unobservable and fully transferable learning by
doing (b = 0), the breakout rule is *(U ) ( . That is, the incumbent is
favored.
Proof: At a = , 3* = ! . Differentiating (74) and using (71) and (73) gives
d*/da < 0 for any a, hence the result.
Q.E.D.
The incumbent should here be favored for two reasons, one because he
works harder in period 2 and second to encourage him to partly internalize its
positive externality on the entrant.
When learning is partly specific, the relevant comparison is with -be1.
Now at 3* = - be1 the rent obtained by the incumbent is higher at the parity
point and this calls for favoring the entrant. This effect may sometimes
dominate the other two. To show this point we compute the derivative of (* +
be1 ) with respect to b at the value b = a = 0 and show that this expression
can be of either sign.
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From (74) we have:
(75)
d *
db a = b = O
where t'' (3)
A F(.3)
-e - it, ()
1+% f(.R)
d F(.3)
1 + -, (.3) 
1+\ d. f (¢)
- ,'(e'(.3)) = I(e2 = b = 0,())
1a = b = .
xk d F(.3) F(.¢)
- V' (.?) [e1 - - -
1+\ d. 3 f(.3) f(.?)d(3:* + be1)(76) a = b = =
db x d F(.3)
1 + V () -
1+\ d.3 f ()
In the case of a quadratic effort function ((e) = e/2) and a uniform
distribution with 3 - 3 = 1, the sign of (76) is the same as that of
1 + 2k1 - (. - 3)
and so is positive for low values of and.negative for high values of .3.
Coming now to the interpretation in terms of menu of linear contracts we
see from (72) and (73) that K 1 > K2 in the quadratic case. The first period
contract is more high powered than the second period because it is more
important to induce higher efforts in period 1. In the more general case, the
rent differential effect (''' evaluated at eI and e2) may overcome this main
effect.
Proposition 11: With unobservable learning by doing, in the quadratic
case, the first period incentive scheme is steeper than the second period
one: K(3) ) K2(.) for all ..
r
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VI AN APPLICATION TO TAKEOVERS
As mentioned in the introduction, our model of second sourcing can shed
some light on the desirability of takeovers. The entrant can be reinterpreted
as a raider, the incumbent as the current managerial team. The accounting cost
stands for per-period performance (profit). The cost parameter () is a
measure of the inefficiency of current management, and the effort variable (e)
refers to the possibility of self-dealing management (appropriation of
profits, luxurious offices, personal jets, golf playing...). The reprocurement
stage can be thought of as a tender offer.14 The rigging of bidding parity in
favor of the incumbent or the entrant is a rough formalization of defensive
tactics and protakeover measures respectively.1 5
Our assumption that the incumbent's incentive scheme is not contingent on
the entrant's performance translates into the assumption that the displaced
managerial team does not keep substantial stock options in the firm after
leaving. This latter assumption is made in most of the literature on the
market for corporate control (e.g., Blair et al [19863, Grossman-Hart [1987],
Harris-Raviv [19873). Theoretical reasons can be found to motivate it. While
the arguments advanced in the context of regulation (in particular the
collusion argument - see section IV) fare less well in this context, it is
well-known that if the managers are even slightly risk averse, the raider and
displaced managers have ex-post an incentive to renegotiate former contracts
and let the displaced managers resell stock options, which no longer serve an
incentive purpose and create an excessive risk in the displaced managers'
portfolio. At a more empirical level, this assumption also makes some sense.
First, many acquired firms do not have outstanding shares after the takeover.
So the incumbent managers automatically exercise their stock options. Second,
even if the raider only acquires control, many managerial contracts specify
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that the managers must exercise their options within 90 days if their
employment is terminated (so, in the context of our model, the options are
exercised well before the investment pays off). We feel that stock options
encourage the incumbent managers to internalize the positive externality of
observable investment on the raiders' post-takeover performance. Our point is
that they very insufficiently or not at all make them internalize the effect
of investments that are not observable by the market. While the process of
investing per se is likely to be observed by the market, the investment
expenditure may not be straightforwardly derived from accounting data (recall
Williamson's argument), and the quality of the investment may be hard to
assess. In a similar spirit, Ruback 1986, p.72) argues that "the management
of most corporations has private information about the future prospects of the
firm. This information usually includes plans, strategies, ideas, and patents
that cannot be made public. Even if they are efficient, market prices cannot
include the value of information that the market does not have." To the extent
that plans, strategies, ideas, and patents result from investments, Ruback's
argument fits with the notion that a non-negligible fraction of investments is
not reflected in the market valuation of the firm.
In a recent and independent paper, Hermalin (1987) analyzes the popular
argument that the takeover threat may lead to underinvestment. His model
differs from ours in many respects and can be thought of as complementary. In
Hermalin's model, investment pays off before the raider enters the market for
corporate control (i.e., in period 1, in the context of our model). Managers
may or may not have an investment opportunity (and this is not observed by
other parties). Investment, if there is an opportunity, is always socially
desirable. However, incumbent managers may not invest even in the presence of
an opportunity. This is because the probability of success of the investment
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is positively correlated with the manager's ability, and a failure signals a
low ability and may encourage a takeover. Hermalin emphasizes how signaling
(managerial career concerns) distorts managerial decisions (more generally
than investments), that might convey information about managers. Our paper
focuses on the nature and transferability of investment, as well as on the
intertemporal evolution of managerial profit-sharing schemes.
Some implications of our model in the takeover context are [comments in
parentheses refer to the analogous result for second sourcing]:
1. Firm performance and probability of takeover are negatively correlated
[the first period cost C 1() and the cut-off efficiency parameter for the
entrant *(.3) are both increasing functions of ].
2. The use of defensive tactics to disadvantage the raider always benefits
the firm's shareholders if the investment is transferable, but may hurt them
if investment is not transferable [propositions 6, 7 and 10].
3. The managers are given linear incentive schemes, which can be
interpreted as stock options [see sections III through V].
4. The incumbent manager's stock options increase over time if investment
is monetary and decrease over time if investment takes the form of learning
by doing [propositions 5 and 11].
Assuming that investment is transferable (as should be most of the
firm's assets), we also have:
5. The manager's incentive package includes stock options and a golden
parachute. The size of the golden parachute is positively related to the
number of stock options [Proposition 9, plus the fact that K 1 (and 2) are
decreasing in 3].
6. The size of the golden parachute is positively related to the firm's
performance. [Proposition 9, plus the fact that a low 3 yields a low cost].
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Conclusion 2 suggests that defensive tactics are not a priori harmful
precisely when takeovers are most likely, i.e. when they involve low losses of
specific managerial investment. While most of the incentive literature on the
topic views takeovers as a managerial discipline device, we do feel that the
popular fear of managerial myopia should not be neglected by economists. (And
this feeling is reinforced by Hermalin's conceptually different argument).
Remark 1: Our results also have some implications for poison pills.
A very rough description of poison pills is that they force the raider to pay
an extra price to acquire the firm. In our model, a poison pill P(R) reduces
by as much the raider's bid (while a golden parachute decreased the incum-
bent's bid)17 In terms of managerial selection, a poison pill is like a nega-
tive golden parachute. We thus obtain:
5'. The amount of poison pills is negatively correlated with the incumbent
manager's stock options.
6'. The amount of poison pills is negatively correlated with the firm's
performance.
Remark 2: We should emphasize that our results are predictions for an
optimal contract. Our view that the shareholders organize a bidding contest
between managerial teams may be too simplistic. So caution should be exercised
when applying our conclusions. But it is worth noting that Walking and Long
[1986] found that managers with large stock holdings are less likely to oppose
takeovers than managers with small stock holdings; and that alatesta and
Walking [1986] provided evidence that firms who adopt poison pill defenses are
relatively unprofitable. Such empirical evidence is consistent with our norma-
tive analysis.
Remark 3: It is worth recalling the intuition of why the golden
parachute (respectively, the poison pill) should increase (respectively,
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decrease) with the manager's ability and performance. A first guess might have
been that bad managers should be encouraged to leave through high golden
parachutes and low poison pills. This however, is not correct, as bidding
between managers already selects the best managers. Our point is that the
auction should be rigged to encourage managers to invest. A (good) manager
with probability .9 of keeping his job picks roughly the right amount of
investment, and further incentives are not needed. A (bad) manager with
probability .1 of keeping his job picks an inefficiently low investment (with
probability .9, this investment goes to a rival manager). A low golden
parachute or a high poison pill increase his probability of keeping his job
and his incentive to invest.
Remark 4: Our paper supplies an efficiency reason for foreclosing entry.
That is, a social planner, whose objective function puts equal weight on the
incumbent and the entrant, biases the auctioning process against the entrant.
When the principal is a private entity (as is the case for shareholders), the
contract signed between the principal and the incumbent does not internalize
its effect on the entrant's welfare. Aghion and Bolton [1987] have shown that
the desire to extract the entrant's rent leads the two initial parties to sign
a contract that favors the incumbent (induces too little "trade" between the
initial vertical structure and the entrant): There is socially too much
foreclosure. Note that both Aghion and Bolton's and our theories yield the
same positive implication: the incumbent is favored at the reprocurement
stage. In our model, poison pills, for instance, have both efficiency as well
as Aghion-Bolton anti-competitive motives.
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VI CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we bring some elements of answer in the agenda set by
Williamson (1976) and the Chicago school concerning the optimal organization
of franchise bidding for natural monopolies. To pursue this research it seems
desirable to study various forms of non-commitment due either to incomplete
contracting and renegotiation1 8 or to the possibility of mutually advantageous
renegotiation .
We have obtained some results concerning the bidding parity, the
decentralization through linear contracts and the intertemporal incentive
structure. Rather than repeating these results, it may be worth assessing the
relevance of the various effects leading the regulator to rig the bidding
process. Breakouts are most likely to be observed (and to be socially
desirable) when the incumbent's investment is transferable to the entrant,
i.e., when the entrant is not too much at a cost disadvantage. However,
Propositions 6 and 10 show that the incumbent should be favored at the
reprocurement stage precisely when investment is transferable. Propositions 8
and 9 furthermore show that the incumbent should be favored more, the higher
the probability of a takeover. This leads us to a somewhat pessimistic
assessment of the possibility of second sourcing in a natural monopoly
situation involving substantial investments.
Last, we showed that a rich yet tractable model can be built that yields
testable equilibrium relationships between switching incentives (like golden
parachutes and poison pills), managerial incentive schemes (like cost sharing
and stock options), probability of second sourcing and incumbent's
performance.
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Appendix 1
From Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), we know that sufficient local second
order conditions are sufficient globally if the condition (CS+) is satisfied.
Here (CS+) is fulfilled:
a aU/OC
( ) = V,"(el) > 0
a,.3 aU/ct
a ou/c
-( - ) = ( - F( ))"(e2) ( 0
aaq au/a, 
-( - ) = f (*)VI' (e2) > .
a, aU//at
The local second order conditions are obtained by signing positively
82 = 
a8,Sa , a= ,3
We can take:
dCI dC d:3*
1 20 0 > 0 - 0
d.3 d.3 d.3
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Appendix 2
a2 u
Sufficient conditions which sign --- are:
) 3a .s .3 = ,8
dC dC 2 dC d.3*
- > O ; - (a + b) -; O
d' 3dR d.! d
These conditions are satisfied by the optimal contract, but the condition
(CS+) is not always fulfilled. (CS+) amounts to:
a au/8C
- --_ ( - 1) = ,"'(e1) - 6(1 - F(.*))(a + b) "(e 2) 0
a3 au/at
a au/ac
( ) = (1 - (1 F(.*))"(e2) 2 0
a.e au/at
a au/a, ,
-( ) = 6f(.¢) (1 - a- b) '(e2) 0
a3 au/at
In particular for quadratic utility functions and 6(a + b) < 1, the (CS+)
conditions are satisfied everywhere. More generally there may be a problem
with the first of these derivatives.
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 8
(i) At . = , the values .5*() = , (i) = 0, '(e1(.3)) = Y'(e 2(.3))
= ' (e' (.')) = 1 and i = 5& solve the first-order conditions. (Note
that this part of Propostion 8 does not rest on assumption A).
(ii) and (iii) We will assume that 3*(S) and (.$3) are differentiable. This
can be proved by using the implicit function theorem and the first-order
conditions.
d *
Let us first note that, - (3) < 1. This is due to the fact that
d3
..*(.3) = (from part i)) and .3*(.3) < .3 for .3 > .3 (from Proposition 6).
Second, we know that e' - e'(.3*(.3)) is equal to e 2 e 2( ) at = (from
d *
part i)). Hence, at .2, one has e2 > e' - . But differentiating (48) in the
d.3
linear-quadratic case, and using the first-order conditions (46) and (47)
yields:
d .* x d.3* ae d 
(A.1) 1 -- = (e'- - e2) -
d 3 1+X d.3 2 1+ d3
This implies that at 3 = ., dv/d, is negative. Now
d de' d.3* de 2
(e -e2) -
d 2 d/.' d ,3 d.
Using (46) and (47) in the linear-quadratic case yields:
d x d./c* a d 
(A.2) -(e' - e 2 -) + -
d3 1+X d3 1+ d3
But (A.l) implies that, at .3 = .3,
d'3* OCe2 dLi - (< - , so that
d.-~ 1+ d./3
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d a dv Xe2
- (e' - e2) ( -- (1 - ) < 0
d.8 1+ d 1+k
as e 2() = 1 and 1 ) (/(1 + )). So, e' ( e2 in a neighbourhood of .
Now, consider the lowest 3 ) 3 such that:
d3 *
either A: e'(.3) -(.) = e2(.)
dV3
or B: e'U3) = ed . *
d.O*
or C: (.a) = 1.
d 3
Condition A cannot be satisfied strictly before B or C is, as - < 1 and
d:3
e' ( e2 in a neighborhood of .
2_~~~~ d /3~d.*
Suppose that condition B is satisfied. So, at this .1, e' e2 and
d.8
d.* d.
- <- 1. The first inequality, together with (A.1) implies that
d3
d,3* .e2 dv
(A.3) 1 - - --
d 3 1+t d.3
du
so that - s 0. Using (A.2), and by the same reasoning as before, we obtain
d.3
d a dv' ke
(A.4) - (e' - e ) - - (1 - ) < 0
d,3 l+a d,;3 1+I
(as e2(.3) = e'(3*(3)) < 1, from equation (47)). So the function e' - e2 cannot
become positive at ?, as it is negative earlier and has a negative slope.
Last, suppose condition C is satisfied. Equation (A.1) can be rewritten
as:
x Oe e d 
(A.5) 2- (e' - e 2 ) =
1+ li+X d3
But (46) and (47) yield:
a dL 
(A.6) e' - e 2 =
1+t d.3
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It is easy to see that (A.5) and (A.6) are inconsistent unless e2 =
But, from (46), and the fact that z(.) ( 0, e2 > 1- . Since we assumed
1+A
that 1 ) 2/(1 + ), we obtain a contradiction.
Thus, neither of the three conditions, A, B or C can obtain to the right
of , which yields parts ii) and iii) of Proposition 8.
Q.E.D.
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Footnotes
1) See also Joskow-Schmalensee (1983) in the context of the regulation of
electric utilities.
2) Williamson (1976) also mentions administrative and political incumbency
advantages which we will not study here.
3) Williamson also makes the important point that contracts are necessarily
incomplete. Indeed, investment has been a major concern in the
literature on the expropriation of relation-specific investment under
incomplete contracting (Williamson [1975, 1985], Grossman-Hart [19863,
Hart-Moore [1985]). While we also emphasize investment incentives, our
paper departs from this literature in several important respects. First,
it assumes away unforeseen contingencies and analyzes complete
contracting. Second, the literature on incomplete contracting studies
the role of ownership; we take ownership as given, and analyze switching
incentives. Third, whether the parties can contract on investment does
not matter in the absence of second sourcing in our model (while it does
under incomplete contracting); assuming incomplete contracting away
allows us to focus on the effects of second sourcing in a cleaner way.
4) This assumption is satisfied by most usual distributions (uniform,
exponential, Pareto, logistic...)
5) For extentions of this result to static auctions see Laffont-Tirole
(1987) and McAfee-McMillan (1987), and to more general settings see
Caillaud and al. (1986), Melumad-Reichelstein (1986) and Picard (1986).
6) This assumes that the firm cannot conceal cost overruns. Another
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potential exception is the incumbent's second period scheme under
monetary investments.
7) It should be noted that when one of the parties' preferences is not
quasi-linear, an informed principal (regulator) strictly gains by not
revealing his information to the agent (entrant) at or before the
contract proposal stage. That is, by pooling at the contract proposal
stage, the different types of principal (referring here to the possible
values of , by abuse of terminology) can trade the slack variables
corresponding to the agent's individual rationality and incentive
compatibility constraints. This may introduce a tension between first
period efficiency and optimal regulation of the entrant.
Also, the Maskin-Tirole result applies as long as the principal's
information does not enter the agent's utility function (in particular,
the agent's information can enter the principal's objective function, as
is the case here).
8) >"''' 0 makes stochastic schemes non-optimal.
9) This assumption of monotone hazard rate property prevents bunching in the
static model.
10) For k=1, the problem is always quasi-concave; for k 1 we need a26 small
enough.
11) One way of making t less manipulable is to force the incumbent to
purchase and hold on to stocks of the entrant in case of breakout.
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12) For cs26 small enough the problem of the incumbent is quasi-concave
and this condition is sufficient to describe its investment behavior.
13) These conditions are sufficient with b26 small which is assumed below.
14) There is of course a large diversity of ways to acquire firms, from
friendly mergers to proxy fights. The view that managerial teams bid
against each other may be a good first approximation, and is taken, e.g.
in Blair et. al (1986), Grossman-Hart (1987) and Harris-Raviv (1987).
It should be noted that other reasonable descriptions of the auctioning
process would yield similar results as in this paper. For instance,
suppose that the raider buys up the whole firm, which then goes private.
The auction is then equivalent to offering a fixed-price contract to the
second source (that is, the raider is made residual claimant for the
firm's second-period profit). Redoing the analysis by assuming that
only a fixed-price contract can be offered to the entrant does not alter
our intuitions.
Note also that our allowing discrimination among the raider's
types yields the result that after a takeover, the firm goes private
(K' i1) when the raider is very efficient ( close to 3), and does not
when the raider is less efficient (K' < 1 for higher s).
15) A slight difference with our social planner formulation is that the
shareholders do not care directly about the managers' welfare. But none
of our qualitative results is affected by this change in the principal's
objective function.
16) We suspect that the many shark repellants are far from being substitutes
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and involve fairly different social costs. It would also be worthwhile
investigating how each favors the incumbent managerial team.
17) So, in the terminology of section IV, P(3) must satisfy:
U' (*(3) ) - P(R) = U2(3).
18) See Grossman-Hart (1986), Klein et al. (1978), Tirole 1986) and
Williamson (1975) for investment concerns, and Laffont-Tirole (1985) for
the ratcheting problem. In an incomplete contract setting, property
rights do serve as switching incentives together with cancellation and
entry fees. For instance, in defense procurement, the government
sometimes ons the property rights on data and technological information
and sometimes does not. Leaving the property right to the defense
contractor can be viewed as a way of biasing the reprocurement stage in
his favor; for the government must bargain with and pay some money (the
equivalent of a cancellation fee) to the defense contractor for the right
to supply the relevant information to a second source. Property rights
have thus some of the features of the switching incentives considered in
this paper. In a takeover context, the corporate charter may influence
the easiness with which a raider can take control of the firm, through
super-majority provisions and staggered board elections (in this respect,
it is interesting to note that Grossman-Hart [1987] argue informally that
family-run firms may sink considerable investments, and therefore may
want to fiaht control chances through the allocation of voting rights).
19) As in Dewatripont 1986) and Hart-Tirole 1987.
20) d-'/d = 0 is impossible. It would yield e' = e2 from (A.7). So condition
- 54 -
B would also be satisfied, which we showed to be inconsistent.
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